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INTRODUCTION
The ultimate question in this case is whether unemployment benefits should be
granted to a claimant who abused both cocaine and alcohol in a dangerous workplace.
Claimant Jon Edwards ("Edwards") assembled air bag systems for automobiles—a far
cry from hamburgers—using rivet guns and other dangerous machinery at Autoliv ASP,
Inc.'s assembly plant.
Edwards was fired by Autoliv after he failed a test for both cocaine and alcohol.
Edwards had a history of work-related substance abuse, and his failed test was taken after
he had worked for several hours one morning after a night on the town. Edwards admits
that he drank large quantities of alcohol that night, but he now denies any cocaine use
during the last ten years. Edwards' drug and alcohol screen tells a different story.
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4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE BOARD ERRED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO GOOD CAUSE FOR
EDWARDS' UNTIMELY APPEAL.
A.

This Court Should Apply a Standard of Review Based on
Reasonableness.

In deciding whether Edwards established good cause for his untimely appeal of the
Department's initial denial of unemployment, this Court should determine whether the
Board's decision is reasonable. Armstrong v. Dep yt of Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 562,
565 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "The ultimate decision as to whether good cause exists is a
mixed question of law and fact and should be affirmed only if it is reasonable."1 Id.
(citing Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Bd. of Review of the Indus. Comm 'n, 775 P.2d 439, 442
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
This Court should not accept the Department's contention that the Board's
decision may be "reverse[d] only upon a plain abuse of discretion." Appellee's Brief

It is notable that the Department failed to include this sentence within the large block
quotation from Armstrong that appears in the Department's brief, particularly since
this sentence is inconsistent with the standard of review advocated by the Department.
The missing sentence should appear at the end of the first blocked paragraph. See
Appellee's Brief at 20. In addition, the second paragraph in the Department's block
quote comes from a footnote rather than from an uninterrupted part of the text. The
Department's brief does not signal the omission of the key sentence with an elipses or
indicate that the remainder of the block quotation comes from a footnote. See Id. at
20-21.
The Department appears to argue that this "abuse of discretion" standard should apply
to all the issues raised in this appeal. As explained herein and in Autoliv's opening
brief, this standard applies to none of the issues. Instead, the Department's decision to
grant Edwards benefits should be reviewed "with only moderate deference" because
the proper application of the Employment Security Act and its relevant rules requires
little highly-specialized or technical knowledge unique to the Department. SOS
Staffing Services, Inc. v. Workforce Appeals Bd, 983 P.2d 581, 583-84 (Utah Ct. App.
(Continued)
5

at 2. The Department incorrectly claims that "[a]ppellant [sic] courts in Utah have
consistently held that the determinations of good cause for late filings from lower level
administrative decisions should be left to the discretion of the agency." Id. at 18.
Notably, the Department does not cite to either statutory or recent case authority in
support of its proposition. Instead, the Department relies exclusively on Salt Lake City
Corp. v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 657 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1982) and Pacheco v. Bd. of
Review, 111 P.2d 712 (Utah 1986), a pair of cases that predates the 1988 adoption of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
Although it remains true that appellate courts grant a degree of deference to
administrative agencies when reviewing the application of law to a particular set of facts,
the Department overreaches when it contends that its decision in this case can be
reviewed only for "an abuse of discretion." Appellee's Brief at 2. Courts measure the
degree of deference due to the agency by weighing factors including policy concerns and
the agency's expertise. Professional Staff Management v. Dep 't of Employment Sec., 953
P.2d 76, 79 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
In this case, "only moderate deference" should be given to the Department's
decision concerning the award of unemployment benefits. Id. As this Court recently
explained, "The proper application of the Employment Security Act and the relevant

(Continued)
1999). Furthermore, the correction-of-error standard applies to those issues involving
Autoliv's due process rights. Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm >?, 817
P.2d 316, 317-18 (Utah 1991); Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control
Bd, 964 P.2d 335, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

6

rules 'requires little highly specialized technical knowledge that would be uniquely
within the Department's expertise.'" Id. (quoting A lien v. Dep V of Employment Sec 781
P.2d 888, 890 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Accordingly, this Court should review the
Department's decision with only moderate deference, and the Department's decision to
accept Edwards' untimely appeal should be affirmed only if the agency's decision was
reasonable.
B.

The Board's Decision to Grant Edwards Unemployment Benefits
Should Be Reversed Because Edwards' Appeal Was Untimely.

This Court should reverse the Board's decision to grant Edwards unemployment
benefits because the Board erroneously found good cause to excuse Edwards' untimely
appeal. It is undisputed that Edwards' attorney filed the appeal beyond the statutory
deadline, but the Board nevertheless accepted the appeal after Edwards' attorney testified
that he believed that the filing deadline was not the deadline printed on the denial notice.
[R. 32, 9:51, 52; 10:1-23]
The Employment Security Act provides that a claiimmt may appeal an initial
denial of benefits by filing a notice of appeal "within ten days of the mailing or personal
delivery of a notice of determination." UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-508(2)(a). The initial
denial becomes final unless "further appeal is initiated under the provisions of this
section." UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-508(l)(d). Because the statutory scheme also
permits the Department to exercise continuous jurisdiction over unemployment claims,
administrative regulations permit the late filing of an appeal in circumstances where

7

"good cause" can be established for the untimely submission. UTAH ADMIN. CODE
R. 994-406-308 (Supp. 1997). The Utah Administrative Code states as follows:
Good cause is limited to circumstances where it is shown that:
(a)
(b)
(c)

the appeal was filed within ten days of actual receipt of the
decision .. .; or
the delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond the
control of the appellant; or
the appellant delayed filing the appeal for circumstances which were
compelling and reasonable.

Id.
In this case, the Board erroneously found that Edwards showed "compelling and
reasonable" circumstances to justify his untimely appeal. The Board accepted the
explanation of Edwards' attorney, Randall Phillips, that he had become confused about
the deadline after the Board issued conflicting initial determinations on May 21, 1998 and
May 22, 1998. Further, the Board found that it was reasonable that Mr. Phillips, an
experienced attorney who had handled more than ten unemployment appeals during the
preceding three years, had mistakenly concluded that he had 30 days to file Edwards'
appeal. [R. 42; R. 32, 9:51-52, 10:1-23.] Because these explanations are neither
compelling nor reasonable, this Court should reverse the Board's decision and deny
unemployment benefits to Edwards.
C.

The Department Was Not Responsible For Any Confusion That Could
Justify Acceptance of Edwards' Late Appeal.

The Department should not be permitted to take the blame for confusion where
there was reason for none. The Department argues that Edwards' late submission was
justified because the Department "caused confusion" by issuing conflicting initial
8

determinations on May 21st and May 22nd.3 Appellee's Brief at 15. The first notice
granted Edwards benefits, whereas the second "corrected notice" denied them.
SeeR. 12-13.
Although Edwards may have been puzzled by the Department's abrupt about-face,
there was no reason to be confused about Edwards' appeal rights. The second notice
stated as follows: "You must appeal in writing within 10 calendar days after this decision
was mailed." [R. 14] The record shows that Edwards understood the need to take swift
action after reading this notice. Edwards testified that he "[w]ent straight to [Randall
Phillips, his attorney]... [t]he very next day [after receiving the May 22nd notice]."
[R. 32, 7:36-40, 8:6-8] Thus, there is no evidence that the notice caused Edwards any
confusion about the time for him to appeal.
The Department apparently wishes to accept partial blame for Edwards' untimely
appeal in order to create a comparison to the circumstances in Pacheco v. Bd. of Review,
111 P.2d 712 (Utah 1986). In Pacheco, the claimant called a hearing officer at the
Department and said that she could not submit her appeal before the deadline. Instead of
emphasizing the finality of the ten-day deadline or offering a formal extension, the
hearing officer instead urged Pacheco to "file as quickly as possible," thereby suggesting
that the late appeal would be accepted by the Department. As a result, the court found
3

The Department also argues that "fairness would dictate that when the Department is at
least in part responsible for creating the problem, a hearing be allowed." Appellee's
Brief at 21. Autoliv does not contend that the initial hearing was improper; rather,
Autoliv objects because, based on the testimony obtained at the hearing, the
Administrative Law Judge should have concluded that there was no good cause
excusing Edwards' untimely appeal.
9

good cause for Pacheco's late appeal because she had relied on the Department's
representations. 717 P.2d at 714-716.
In contrast, the present case is distinguishable from Pacheco because neither
Edwards nor his attorney delayed this appeal based on any representation from the
Department. Indeed, neither Edwards nor his attorney contacted the Department at all.
Moreover, all of the information provided to Edwards and his attorney by the Department
was accurate and true. The May 22nd notice stated that Edwards' appeal needed to be
filed within ten days. This statement is clear and unambiguous. There was no reason for
confusion about this requirement, and thus no good cause justifying Edwards' untimely
appeal.

D.

The Erroneous Legal Reasoning of Edwards' Attorney Does Not
Constitute Good Cause for the Late Filing.

The Department cannot defend its flawed decision by inviting undeserved blame
for the error of Edwards' attorney. Attorney Phillips filed the appeal at least five days
too late supposedly because he concluded—incorrectly—that the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act ("UAPA") set the deadline for appeal. [R. 36] The Utah Administrative
Procedures Act plainly states, however, that the Act "does not govern . . . the initial
determination of any person's eligibility for unemployment benefits." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 63-46b-l(2)(i) (emphasis added). In light of the plain language of both this UAPA
provision and the May 22nd notice, it was unreasonable for an attorney of Phillips'
experience to disregard the notice's ten-day deadline in favor of a limitations period

10

defined by an unrelated statute. The Board thus erred in finding good cause for the late
filing of Edwards' appeal.
The Department also maintains that good cause was established for the late appeal
because "claimant's attorney believed some kind of appeal had occurred making UCA
63-46b-3(l)(vi) applicable with its 30 day time limit for filing an appeal."' Appellee's
Brief at 17. Although the Department has never developed this argument or explained its
rationale, apparently the Department contends that Mr. Phillips believed that the
May 22nd notice was an appellate decision rather than an initial determination of benefits.
This strained interpretation of events cannot be reconciled with the terms of the May 22nd
notice, which direct the claimant to appeal to the agency within ten days rather than to the
court of appeals within thirty days.
Moreover, Phillips' conduct cannot be squared with the explanation of his conduct
now advanced by the Department. If Phillips believed that the May 22nd decision
announced a final appellate decision at the administrative level, then Edwards would
have had 30 days in which to file an appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. Yet Phillips
ultimately filed the appeal with the agency rather than the court of appeals. On the other
hand, if Phillips thought that the notice meant what it said—that he had ten days to appeal
an initial denial of benefits to the agency—then it was unreasonable for Phillips to allow
the ten days to expire in reliance on an unrelated UAPA provision.
In summary, the late submission of Edwards' appeal by his attorney cannot be
blamed on the Department or excused by his attorney's reliance on the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act. Moreover, it was unreasonable of the Board to accept
11

any of these explanations after Phillips acknowledged that he had been aware of the tenday deadline. Phillips testified as follows:
Q:
A:

Well, did you understand that there was a time limitation
as far as filing an appeal?
Yes, I did, your honor. The—From what I understand is
that from ruling that within ten days you need to file the
appeal. . .

[R. 32, 9:51-52, 10:1-2 (emphasis added)]
The Board thus erred when it ignored this testimony and concluded that good
cause had been shown for the untimely appeal. It was unreasonable for the Board to
conclude that "compelling and reasonable" circumstances justified the acceptance of the
tardy appeal in light of Phillips' testimony that he was aware of the deadline, the clear
directions on the May 22nd notice to appeal to the agency within ten days, and the express
terms of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. This Court should therefore reverse
the Board and dismiss Edwards' claim for unemployment benefits.
E.

This Court Should Follow Armstrong and Avoid the Creation of a
Double Standard for Attorneys.

Not surprisingly, the Department's brief barely addressed Armstrong v. Dep 't of
Employment Sec., 834 P.2d 562 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), a case in which this Court rejected
as untimely an appeal filed only one day late by a pro se claimant who claimed confusion
between "working days" and "calendar days." Given this Court's unwillingness to
extend the filing deadline even a single day for an unrepresented worker who believed he
had ten "working days" rather than ten "calendar days" to appeal, this Court cannot
affirm the Board's decision to give shelter to an experienced lawyer who filed an appeal
at least five days too late. Edwards' attorney had handled more than ten unemployment
12

appeals during the preceding three years, and he was aware of the ten-day deadline.
[R. 42; R. 32, 9:37-38]. His professed confusion about the deadline arose after he
reviewed a statute that stated its inapplicability to this appeal. Moreover, he made no
effort to resolve his alleged confusion with a simple phone call to the Department.
This Court cannot affirm the Board's decision without either overturning
Armstrong or creating a double standard for attorneys. The law should not be more
lenient of lawyers, nor should it be more forgiving of lawyers than pro se litigants. The
decision of the Board is not reasonable and should be reversed. Edwards' claim for
unemployment benefits should be dismissed.

II.

AUTOLIV DID NOT INTENTIONALLY WITHHOLD EVIDENCE FROM
THE ORIGINAL HEARING.
This Court should not be misled by the Department's nonsensical allegation that

Autoliv purposely withheld the chain of custody report. It defies reason that Autoliv
would intentionally withhold a document that conclusively establishes Edwards' positive
test for both cocaine and a high level of alcohol (.11 %). Autoliv's inability to produce
this document at the original hearing resulted not from purposeful intent but rather from a
combination of bad luck, good intentions gone awry, and the chaos of the GM strike.
The Department incorrectly assumes that Autoliv had a chain of custody report in
its possession at the time of the hearing. This assumption is both inaccurate and
unsupported by the record.4 The drug and alcohol screen was performed by Northwest

4

In its statement of facts, the Department alleges that "Dr. Potter retained the 'Chain of
Custody/Report Form' and sent a copy to the employer." Appellee's Brief at 5. The
(Continued)
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Toxicology Labs, which sent a copy of the basic "Drug Test Report" to Autoliv. See
R. 1. Notably, this was the only document from the drug screen that came into Autoliv's
possession before the hearing, and the company entered it into evidence. Id. Autoliv did
not obtain the chain of custody report until later, and then the company promptly
delivered it to the Department.
The Department misinterprets and twists a number of comments in an effort to
support its fantastic conclusion that "Autoliv was allowed to present its evidence and
chose not to." Appellee's Brief at 27. The Department then suggests that "[a]ny
argument to the contrary is a misstatement of the facts." Id. This statement proves ironic
given the Department's own surprising lack of fidelity to the record. Consider the
allegation that followed this bromide:
[Autoliv] even had its evidence available at the time of the hearing through
the testimony of Dr. Potter. When Dr. Potter admitted he was in possession
of the test results, Ms. Stice could have asked him to fax it to the
Department.
Id. The second sentence in this passage deserves scrutiny, especially since its latter half
is nothing more than rank speculation. The opening clause—"[wjhen Dr. Potter admitted
he was in possession of the test results"—is at best a speculative inference based on a

(Continued)
Department's citations to the record do not support its account, however. There is no
evidence that the chain of custody report was sent to Autoliv before the hearing.
Dr. Potter testified only that he sent a "report" of the positive result to Autoliv.
[R. 32: 21-23] The "report" to which Dr. Potter referred was the simple "Drug Test
Report," not the chain of custody report. See R. 1.
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suggestive statement; at worst, the clause is a fabrication contradicted by Dr. Potter's
testimony:
PHILLIPS: And you indicated [that] you don't have the chain of custody
[report].
POTTER: Not with me. Not—Not right here. I did review the chain of
custody yes when I did the report and submitted it, but I don't
have that with me right now.
PHILLIPS: I have nothing further.
JUDGE: Dr. Potter, do you know who would retain the—the drug testing
results and information of that nature?
POTTER: We would have it here, but I don't, like I say, I don't have that
right with me right now.
[R. 32: 27: 3-15 (emphasis added)] This testimony establishes—contrary to the
Department's contention—that the chain of custody test report was not in Dr. Potter's
personal possession when he testified. Although his statement that "[w]e would have it
here" invites speculation that Dr. Potter might have been able to search for the chain of
custody report, it is sheer conjecture for the Department to suggest that Dr. Potter could
have located the report and faxed it to the ALJ during the original hearing. It is also
noteworthy that the ALJ did not ask Potter whether he could send a copy of the report.
Perhaps most importantly, Dr. Potter never indicated any unwillingness to share the
positive test report; rather, he repeatedly stated that he didn't have the report at his
fingertips.
The Department is misguided in its contention that Autoliv "decided not to
release" a document proving that Edwards tested positive for cocaine and a blood alcohol
of .11%. Appellee's Brief at 6. The Department contends that Autoliv "made a
calculated decision, in conjunction with its attorney, to withhold evidence at the
evidentiary hearing." Id. at 22. The only evidence the Department cites to support this
15

conclusion is the e-mail sent by Autoliv's in-house counsel nine days before the hearing.
This message was sent to one of Autoliv's human resource specialists, and copies were
also forwarded to the ALJ, several other Autoliv employees, and Valerie Stice, who
represented Autoliv at the original hearing. Because the Department assigns such great
import to selected passages of this missive, its entire text is reprinted below:
I understand the Brigham facility will be shut down this week for the 4th of July and
the GM strike. In any event, as soon as you return, please fax the chain of custody
form for J. Edwards' drug/alcohol test to Valerie @ Gibbons ASAP @ fax 801-2610110.
I believe we discussed the issue last week during which we agreed to release the
form without showing the actual readings or the substance involved. The main
objective in releasing the form will be to establish propriety in handling the sample
and to show that no tampering occurred. The form has several copies, to which the
employer has a right to retain one copy showing the name, etc.
For Valerie:
Please explain @ the hearing that the chain of custody form will be available for the
ALJ upon return from the shutdown caused by the strike.
Please call me if you have any questions @ 29598 or 625-9598
Thanks.

See Addendum H to Appellee's Brief.
This message, when read in whole and in the context of the GM strike, cannot
reasonably support the radical conclusion drawn by the Department. The first and last
paragraphs confirm that the chain of custody report was unavailable because of the GM
strike and the holiday. In addition, the final note—the attorney's request that Stice let the
ALJ know that the test results would be available after the nationwide strike ended—also
corroborates the company's intention to turn Edwards' positive alcohol and cocaine tests
over to the Department at its earliest opportunity.
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The Department focused its gaze on the second paragraph alone. There Autoliv's
counsel advised that the company had made a preliminary decision not to release the
test's readings. It seemed unnecessary, since the positive cocaine result justified
Edwards' termination by itself. But the Department now reads this paragraph as evidence
that Autoliv intended to withhold vital evidence: "It is presumed that the bottom portion
of the Chain of Custody/Report Form was to be masked in such a way as not to show the
test results." Appellee's Brief at 7. This purported "fact" is a presumption—and it is
simply wrong. The message's plain language showed that the company was considering
withholding the numerical readings, not the results.5 Besides, if the company had
actually insisted on concealing the readings, then the company would have eventually
submitted a redacted report for the hearing. Instead, the company provided the entire
document to the Department, as promised, as soon as it became available.
The Department's conspiracy theory cannot be reconciled with Autoliv's conduct.
For example, if the company had actually wanted to conceal evidence from the
Department, it makes little sense that Autoliv's in-house counsel would notify the ALJ

5

The Department also argues that Autoliv could not prevail without submitting the
readings. See Appellee's Brief at 25-26. To the contrary, Autoliv could—and did—
establish just cause for Edwards' termination even without the readings. After all, a
positive cocaine test constituted grounds for termination under the company's zerotolerance policy. [R. 124]. Furthermore, because Edwards had a history of workrelated alcohol abuse—he had been placed on probation after he had been arrested and
charged with driving a company-rented vehicle while under the influence of alcoholEdwards testified that he was aware that he could be terminated if he tested positive for
drugs or alcohol. [R. 189:46-49] This testimony by itself satisfies the knowledge and
culpability prongs, and the control prong has been met because Edwards was in control
of his consumption of cocaine and large quantities of alcohol.
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nine days before the hearing about the company's difficulties obtaining the report.
[R. 31] Nor does it make sense, given the Department's view, that Autoliv's
representative at the hearing repeatedly pled for permission to leave the record open so
that the company could submit the chain of custody report. [R. 32: 21:21-31, 29:14-16]
Indeed, the most compelling fact that undermines the Department's theory is this:
upon conclusion of the GM strike, Autoliv obtained the chain of custody report and
immediately submitted it to the Board. There is no logical reason why Autoliv would
have intentionally delayed the delivery of this document. After all, the chain of custody
report establishes conclusively the Edwards consumed both cocaine and a large quantity
of alcohol before beginning his shift as a rivet gunner.

III.

THIS CASE IS EASILY DISTINGUISHED FROM GRACE DRILLING.
This Court should not be misled by the Department's efforts to analogize this case

to Grace Drilling v. Bd of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Although there
are some similarities between Grace Drilling and this case, the Department is
overreaching when it argues that the facts in Grace Drilling are "so compeUingly similar
to the facts in this case as to be controlling." Appellee's Brief at 22. To the contrary,
there are significant differences between the two cases. Moreover, these differences
demand and dictate different results.
For example, Grace Drilling was unwilling to provide the drug test report when so
requested, whereas Autoliv was unable to present the chain of custody report at the
hearing. Furthermore, unlike the employer in Grace Drilling, Autoliv made reasonable
efforts to obtain the chain of custody report before the hearing. Autoliv also advised the
18

ALJ nine days before the hearing about the difficulties it was encountering in its effort to
secure the report.
Autoliv's willingness to present evidence of Edwards' substance abuse also
distinguishes this case from Grace Drilling, In that case, "the written test results were
not offered into evidence, and Grace Drilling failed to call any witness who had
administered the test or who was otherwise familiar with the testing procedures." Grace
Drilling, 776 P.2d at 65. In contrast, Autoliv introduced the Drug Test Report and called
several witnesses, including Dr. Potter, who had filled out the Drug Test Report, with
personal knowledge relating to Edwards' drug test. See R. 1.
Nevertheless, given Autoliv's diligence, it is puzzling that the Board refused to
leave the record open, especially since the ALJ in Grace Drilling practically begged the
employer in that case to submit the test results. As the court of appeals explained:
At the conclusion of the hearing, the appeal referee requested further
information, including a copy of the test results which Grace Drilling
agreed to provide. The record was left open for this purpose. However,
Grace Drilling later advised the appeal referee that it would not provide
the test report. Accordingly, the appeal referee affirmed the Department of
Employment Security's initial disposition awarding [the claimant] benefits
based on the available evidence in the record.
Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 65 (emphasis added).
In this case, Autoliv sought only what Grace Drilling was offered (and then
surprisingly wasted): permission to submit documentation of the claimant's positive drug
test after the initial hearing. Autoliv repeatedly asked the ALJ to leave the record open so
it could obtain and submit the chain of custody report. Autoliv made its first request even
before the hearing opened, and the hearing transcript is peppered with the company's
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requests for this accommodation. [R. 31; R. 32: 21:21-31, 29:14-16] Yet Autoliv's
request was summarily denied.
The ALJ's refusal to leave the record open for Edwards' positive drug test
markedly distinguishes this case from Grace Drilling, Because of the ALJ's decision,
Autoliv never had the chance to submit the chain of custody report. In contrast, as the
court of appeals observed, "Grace Drilling was given two opportunities to present the
results and lay the appropriate foundation for receiving them into evidence." Id. at 70.
The present case is also distinguishable from Grace Drilling because there was a
second hearing. This difference matters because Autoliv was denied the right to use the
chain of custody report at the reconvened hearing. When Edwards testified under oath
that he had not used cocaine for a decade, Autoliv requested and was denied permission
to impeach Edwards' dishonest testimony with the chain of custody report. The Board's
decision tainted the proceedings and deprived Autoliv of due process. The Board's
decision improperly elevated its procedural concerns over the truth-finding process.
Although the Board rationalized that it would be unfair to allow Autoliv to "relitigate"
the case by admitting the drug test, the truth was sacrificed. Public policy demands that
this Court reach a different result.
This case deserves an outcome based on the unique set of facts presented. This
case is not comparable to Grace Drilling because (1) Autoliv introduced some evidence
at the hearing about the claimant's drug test; (2) Autoliv notified the hearing officer in
advance when it encountered trouble securing the chain of custody report; (3) Grace
Drilling was unwilling to provide the drug test report when so requested, whereas Autoliv
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was unable to present the chain of custody report at the hearing; (4) the hearing officer in
Grace Drilling agreed to leave the record open to receive the drug test, but the ALJ in
this case refused the same request; (5) unlike the employer in Grace Drilling, Autoliv
was always willing to submit documentation of the drug test to the agency; and (6) this
case involved a second proceeding at which Autoliv was denied the opportunity to
confront a witness with evidence that was in the company's possession. Given these
significant distinctions, the Department's comparison to Grace Drilling fails. This case
should be decided on its own merits, and Edwards' application for unemployment
benefits should be dismissed.

IV.

THE DEPARTMENT VIRTUALLY CONCEDED THAT AUTOLIV WAS
DENIED A FAIR HEARING.
The Department made almost no effort to refute Autoliv's contentions that (1) the

Board improperly established and enforced higher procedural and evidentiary standards
for Autoliv than for Edwards; (2) the Board and the second ALJ erred by refusing to
allow Autoliv to impeach Edwards' testimony with his positive drug test result; and
(3) the first ALJ's behavior at the primary hearing was improper and prejudicial. These
issues are vitally important, and the Board did nothing more than offer cursory denials, if
the arguments were addressed at all. Faced with such silence in the face of compelling
facts, this Court should reverse the Board's decision and remand because Autoliv was not
afforded a fair hearing.
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V.

AUTOLIV ESTABLISHED JUST CAUSE FOR EDWARDS'
TERMINATION WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
This Court should reverse the Board because Autoliv established with competent

evidence that Edwards was terminated for just cause. Under Utah law, an employer bears
the burden of showing: (1) the employee's knowledge of expected conduct; (2) that the
offending conduct was within the employee's power and capacity to control; and (3)
culpability. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R. 994-405-202 (Supp. 1997).
The Department did not contest the fact that an employer may establish a just
cause termination for drug use without showing that the employer complied with any
testing policy. The Utah Administrative Code provides that "[i]n addition to the drug
and alcohol testing provisions above, a prima facie case of ineligibility for benefits under
the Employment Security Act may be established through the introduction of other
competent evidence" UTAH ADMIN. CODE R. 994-405-208(6)(f) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis
added).
This Court should reverse the Board's decision because, even without the positive
chain of custody test result, Autoliv presented enough competent evidence to establish
just cause for Edwards' termination. Autoliv proved that: (1) Edwards had knowledge
that Autoliv expected him to abstain from both alcohol and illegal drugs; (2) Edwards had
the capacity to control his consumption of alcohol and illegal drugs; and (3) Edwards
engaged in culpable conduct based on Autoliv's expectations.
Furthermore, the Board compounded its error by apparently excluding dispositive
evidence: namely, Edwards' confession to one of Autoliv's human resource officers that
he had used cocaine, a statement that was corroborated by the chain of custody test result
22

that was proffered but not accepted into evidence by the Board. Because confessions are
admissions by party-opponents, Edwards' statement is not hearsay, and it supports a
finding of just cause for Edwards' termination.

CONCLUSION
This Court should dismiss Edwards' application for unemployment compensation.
In the alternative, this Court should remand this action to the Department of Workforce
Services for farther proceedings.
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day of March, 2000.
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